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OFFICER PRESTIGE.

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OFFICER PRESTIGE

A Navy Management School Research Paper
By LCDR John L. Taylor, USN

ABSTRACT

There have been many studies made in the Navy which attempt to find the reasons why so many capable officers turn their backs on a Navy career. The writer feels that one of these reasons is an attitude which prevails that the naval officer profession is assigned relatively low status or low prestige. Since prestige is such an intangible, it is not possible to cover all areas of the spectrum of prestige. However, an attempt is made to touch on both sides of the issue by looking at the public viewpoint and the self-image of the naval officer.

A few public opinion type polls are cited in this paper. Not much weight is given to them because of the several types of bias which appear when such a subject is discussed. More important than polls are the attitudes which come to light through the actions of the mass communications networks, the officials of the Government, and contacts with the public by naval officers. In discussing these attitudes, the writer tries to spotlight some of the forces which act against prestige. As a result, it becomes evident that in many instances the Navy is its own worse enemy. The prestige of the naval officer is challenged almost daily. This paper attempts to provoke thought how these challenges lead to frustration and lower the self-image.

Some of the Navy attempts to improve prestige, such as the resurrection of the sword, are empty tokens. The fact that attempts are made is an admission that the problem exists. Unfortunately, the problem is not understood. The writer recognizes that some of the recommendations advocate sweeping changes. Other recommendations request the action of the reader to improve leadership and, consequently, the prestige of all naval officers.

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OFFICER PRESTIGE

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INTRODUCTION

The Armed Forces are continuously studying the factors which attract or repel capable young men into, away from or out of the military services as a career. Because of the continuing need to maintain large forces capable of providing security to our nation since the end of World War II, most of the emphasis has been concentrated on this problem since that time. The procurement of officers during a declared war is a problem because of the necessity to obtain large numbers of qualified men from the manpower available. At such a time there is no retention problem since most officers are frozen in the services for the duration of hostilities. Procurement and retention of officers become pressing during times of peace or relative peace, in spite of legislative restrictions on the total strength of the respective services which reduce them drastically from their wartime highs. It is imperative, therefore, that the services obtain the best possible caliber of young men and retain them in the services, if the Armed Forces are to prevent mediocrity and build the types of organization which will respond no matter which of the many "panic buttons" might be pushed. As an adjunct to this thought is the cold fact that the services which are in being on "D-Day" will be the nucleus around which will be formed the greatly expanded forces of war.

Yet the battle for the cream of the crop of our young men is waged with an alphabet of weapons which are used either consciously or unconsciously by the military and civilian worlds of endeavor. We find that adventure is counterbalanced by deprivation; service to Country is counterbalanced by public criticism; fringe benefits are matched by industry or whittled away by Congress and pay is falling further behind civilian careers with comparable responsibilities. These are but a few of the factors which influence the choice or rejection of a military career in preference to others. To narrow this field is difficult since the factors are so closely related to one another and blend into what I call the spectrum of prestige. To examine a subject as broad as this the service elements will be separated and only one of them explored, since I feel that the spectrum of prestige for each service is different. Therefore, only the Navy element will be studied in this paper and it will be condensed further by focusing on a small part of the Navy spectrum of officer prestige.

The basic hypothesis of this paper is that prestige is one of the most important aspects in the life of a career naval officer. As a corollary, it follows that the higher the prestige attached to being a naval officer, the greater will be the prestige of the naval service and the more attractive it will be to those who are still too young to be a part of it as well as to those of us on active

duty and in the reserve components. Further, it is contended that officer prestige is currently in a period of ascendancy; however, positive and determined steps must be taken to prevent its future decline.

This need for increasing prestige has been recognized by the Department of Defense.

There is a common saying in the services, and elsewhere, that greater privileges grow out of greater responsibilities, and that the latter justifies the former. This is part truth and part fable.

In military organizations, as in industry, business, and political life, the more important a man's position, the more lavish he is likely to be in his office appointments and living arrangements, and the greater the care that is apt to be taken of freeing him of trifling annoyances. . . . When men are successful, they like the good things in life. Why deny it? Not one individual in 10,000 would aspire to power and authority if it meant living like a hermit. There is no way that the military establishment can denature human nature, and change this determining condition, nor is there any reason why it should wish to do so. Its men, like all others develop a sense of well being from those advantages, many of them minor, which attend, and build prestige, both in private and in official life. . . . It is by enhancing the prestige of leaders and by making their positions attractive that the Armed Forces get better officers and men. . . . At all levels, men will aspire more, and their ambition will be firmer, if getting ahead will mean for them an increase in the visible tokens of deference from the majority, rather than simply a boost in paycheck.¹

¹ The Armed Forces Officer, Department of Defense, p. 25.

OFFICER PRESTIGE

CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF PRESTIGE

Prestige brings to mind such words as esteem, status, recognition, respectability, trust, confidence, honor and social class. There are two principal ways to look at prestige. It can be the viewpoint of the public at large or it can be an organizational self-image. Whichever is used, there are like and different connotations to each viewpoint. Vance Packard has listed six factors which he used to assign prestige to occupations in his book The Status Seekers.

1. The importance of the task performed.
2. The authority and responsibility inherent in the job.
3. The knowledge required.
4. The brains required.
5. The dignity of the job.
6. The financial reward of the occupation.²

It is offered that there are other factors which influence the prestige or status assigned to the naval officer, such as:

1. Historical aspects.
2. Current events or information.
3. Lack of information or misinformation.

² Vance Packard, The Status Seekers, pp. 94-97.

THE HISTORY OF THE

REIGN OF

CHARLES THE FIRST

IN WHICH ARE CONTAINED THE
MOST IMPORTANT AND INTERESTING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF HIS REIGN
FROM HIS MARRIAGE TO HIS DEATH
IN THE YEAR 1649
BY
JOHN BURNET
BISHOP OF SALISBURY

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOLUME THE FIRST
LONDON
Printed by J. Streater, at the Sign of the Gun, in St. Dunstons Church-yard, near St. Dunstons Church, in the County of Middlesex.
1724

THE SECOND VOLUME
LONDON
Printed by J. Streater, at the Sign of the Gun, in St. Dunstons Church-yard, near St. Dunstons Church, in the County of Middlesex.
1724

By Authority.

The introductory sentence of The Professional Soldier, a recent study of the social and political background of the military officers, states, "The civilian image of the professional soldier remains firmly rooted in the past . . . the outdated and obscure conceptions of the military establishment persist because civilian society, including the alert political public, prefer to remain uninformed."³ This appears to bear out two of the three points made above but will be covered in more detail later. Current events, as a factor of prestige, will also be more fully covered and go hand-in-hand with lack of information or misinformation.

As far as the motivating forces to increase prestige, it is readily understandable that the civilian populace, with a few exceptions, has little motivation or desire to increase the prestige of the naval officer. These exceptions are worth mention as they do much work in this field. The Navy League of the United States and the Naval Academy Alumni Association are the more active organizations. However, the motivation of any group to enhance self-prestige is one of the driving forces of any occupation or organization, but it is almost entirely up to the members of each distinct group and is of little concern to those outside the group. This is but one reason why we in the naval service have a common obligation to one another to do everything we can to enhance our own prestige. Morris

³

Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 3.

Janowitz makes this same point very well. "But, as the military profession grows larger and socially more heterogeneous, as it becomes more of a career, does not pressure develop for prestige recognition by the public at large? Every professional soldier, like every businessman or government official, represents his establishment and must work to enhance the prestige of his profession."⁴

THE CONCERN FOR PRESTIGE

"The incentive system by which our country has prospered has always recognized that privilege is a reward for effort and enterprise. The American people have always accepted that reasonable, harmless privileges should attend merit. It is by enhancing the prestige of leaders and by making their positions attractive that the Armed Forces get better officers and men."⁵ Naval officers have had many experiences with the quest for prestige and have been taught from their earliest naval days that "rank hath its privileges." They have also seen a decrease in the privileges to which they thought they were entitled and certainly have seen one of the reasons for such decreases. This reason is the abuse of privileges by a few for which the many are made to pay. Yet the fact remains that, although our newly commissioned ensigns expect a certain amount of lowering

⁴Ibid., p. 11.

⁵The Armed Forces Officer, op. cit. p. 25.

It is a very old and well known fact that the

people of the world are not all of the same

color, but that they are of many different

colors, and that these colors are of many

different shades, and that these shades are of

many different degrees of purity, and that

THE COLOR OF THE SKIN

is a very old and well known fact that the

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purity, and that the color of the skin is a

very old and well known fact

that the people of the world are not all of the same

of prestige when they report to their first command, they are probably not prepared for the first shock of being the "boot ensign," and take a certain amount of precious time to recover from the effects of the blow. From this time on, the young officer starts his uphill battle for recognition and prestige.

In view of the foregoing, I feel it necessary to dispel any notion that a "kid glove" type of treatment for our junior officers is advocated. The only intent at this time is to set the stage for the recommendations and to emphasize the fact that one of the reasons for this study is to make the reader aware that prestige plays an important part in the retention of our junior officers. It is hoped that the reader will pause a moment and reminisce of the "good old days" before the Navy started "going to hell." Was that first year of commission all "sweetness and light"?

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF PRESTIGE

There are few people remaining in the United States today who can remember back much further than the Spanish-American War. Anything which is known about naval officers who served their country prior to that time has been learned through the various means of communications which convey historical information. We in the naval service look back to events which occurred prior to the turn of the century as tradition formulating happenings as well as historical facts. That some of this tradition has become a part of our national heritage is entirely possible and it is unlikely that there are many people who hold naval officers of the historical past in anything but high esteem since the only names they remember are the names of the heroes.

The Spanish-American War was primarily a naval victory which was culminated in the revenge of the MAINE and Dewey's famous Battle of Manila Bay. After this came the world cruise of the "Great White Fleet," which displayed the American flag throughout the world and increased the prestige of the American citizens everywhere. Not long after, came World War I and with it a gradual rise in the prestige of all services because it was the patriotic way to think, if nothing else, as this war was not primarily naval in nature. Following this war prestige declined, as it does after almost any war, but it sank

to a new low following the disarmament conferences in 1922 and 1930. Between World War I and World War II, the Armed Forces were in a period of relative stagnation, but from the low ebb of the 1920s to the early 1930s, prestige could go no way but up. During the depression years of the 1930s, many young men entered the service academies for the express purpose of obtaining the free, "\$25,000 education," as it used to be referred to, before inflation. Janowitz refers to this period as the "Growth of Careerism," and points out how the social background of academy applicants changed from one of high social status and members of service families to one of broader social base.⁶ It was evident to the writer at this time, while attending junior high and senior high school in a "Navy town," that the naval officers and their families enjoyed high status and prestige, although at that time I hardly knew the definition of the words. Navy commanders were furnished with two and three story government quarters, with servants quarters in the rear. A new prestige automobile seemed to be in every garage, the surrounding grounds were kept beautifully landscaped and trimmed and the many fringe benefits which these families enjoyed were quite evident. A point worth emphasizing at this time is the fact that my exposure to such status symbols through association with Navy Juniors did not give me my initial motivation toward a navy career, but it did affect my ultimate decision.

After Pearl Harbor, the Navy grew as a geometric progression.

⁶
Ibid., p. 116.

By sheer numbers alone, it was possible for almost anyone who had two years of college to obtain a commission. As a result of this rapid growth and promotion acceleration, where it seemed only necessary to be possessed of a warm body to insure selection by AlNav, leadership suffered, morale suffered, and millions of enlisted men became fed up with the officers over them who were "officers and gentlemen by act of Congress." With VJ Day and the mass exodus of the civilian sailor back to his natural habitat, the loathsome feeling toward naval officers and the bad taste which was still in his mouth went with him. It is evident that there were many naval officers who anxiously awaited their accumulation of necessary number of points and felt this same way. It is probably safe to say that every enlisted man who served in the Navy during World War II had at least one pot story to tell the folks back home concerning an incapable, arrogant, immoral or otherwise unprofessional naval officer with whom he had come into contact. Simple addition will reveal the generation to which these civilians now belong and it is offered that many of these bad impressions still remain firmly rooted.

In the post-war era, therefore, it became popular to ridicule and to distrust those naval officers who were still in the service. The naval profession was attacked from all sides by columnists, commentators, novelists, movie script writers, Congressmen and anyone else who could make himself heard. A new low ebb was reached during

the reign of Louis Johnson. It is a matter of conjecture whether his efforts almost left us high and dry or whether they nearly sank us. In all fairness to Mr. Johnson, let it suffice to say that he certainly had plenty of assistance. It was while in a low state of preparedness, because of the austerity program which had been forced upon the Navy, that the Korean War suddenly exploded.

The active participation of the Navy in the hostilities increased, once again, the prestige of the officer corps, however, there were some members of the Naval Reserve who were quite bitter with the method used for the partial mobilization which took place. Immediately after the war, prestige slipped again for the usual post-war reasons, but not to the low state which had prevailed prior to Korea.

The Cold War period which we have been in since the truce negotiations of Korea, has seen a series of brush fires in which the Navy has played a major fire fighting role. Suez, Lebanon, Quemoy, Viet-Nam, Cuba and Laos are examples of the brush fire type of armed conflict. These actions have all resulted in the deployment of naval forces to counter proposed or actual threats and have brought the dramatic impact of the necessity of seapower closer to the American public. As a direct result, the capability of the Navy has been kept in the Public's Eyes. This is but one of the reasons, this constant

use of military power, which has caused C. Wright Mills to refer to the "power Elite," as composed of, "political, economic and military men." Mills goes on to state that,

Of the three types of circle that compose the power elite today, it is the military that has benefited the most in its enhanced power, although the corporate circles have also become more explicitly entrenched in the more public decision-making circles. It is the professional politician that has lost the most, so much that in examining the events and decisions, one is tempted to speak of a political vacuum in which the corporate rich and the high warlord, in their coinciding interests rule.⁷

Mills recognizes the increase in prestige of the military during periods of strife by stating,

The prestige of public office and military position, for example, is higher in times of war, when business executives become dollar-a-year men and railroad colonels, and all groups rally behind the militant state of war. But when business-as-usual prevails, when businessmen leave government to others, public office and military status have often been vilified, as the prestige of public employment is deflated in favor of big business.

In addition, he states that "as military men have become more powerful during the wars and during the war-like interludes between, they too have joined the new national prestige scheme."⁹ Of course the power elite to which Mills refers is primarily in the flag-rank

⁷ C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, p. 276.

⁸ Ibid., p. 86.

⁹ Ibid., p. 85.

of the military, however, it is highly probable that a little of this increased status and its corresponding decreases has rubbed off on the other officers in the rank structure. In view of the foregoing, I believe that the prestige of the Naval officer which is synonymous with esteem, recognition, respectability and confidence is in a period of ascendancy at the present time.

CHAPTER III

THE PUBLIC VIEWPOINT

Public opinion polls have been used by sociologists to provide empirical evidence to substantiate the formulation of their varied hypotheses. It is not possible to attach much weight to such polls which concern the prestige of naval officers, since there is bound to be bias of one kind or another. This is caused by the fact that it makes some difference where those polled resided and what contact, if any, they had had with naval officers. In addition, the image of the naval officer in the public eye can range from ensign or warrant officer to admiral. It is possible, therefore, that the prestige attached to naval officers by persons residing in Omaha, Nebraska would be higher than that which residents of Norfolk, Virginia would assign, where there is an overabundance of officers.

As a starting point, regardless of the lack of validity of public opinion polls, the following list of one poll taken in 1955 under the direction of Dr. George Gallup, is submitted as an example:

1. Physician.
2. Scientist.
3. College Professor.
4. Lawyer.
5. Minister or Priest.
6. Public School Teacher.
7. Officer in Armed Services.
8. Farm Owner
9. Carpenter.

- 13. Radio or TV Announcer.
- 16. Enlisted Man in Armed Services.
- 17. Truck Driver.¹⁰

One of the lists of job prestige which Packard cites was taken from a sample made by the Chicago Tribune in 1956. This list finds flag-rank military officers in the highest status group, navy captains in the second status group, and all other commissioned officers in the third status group. There was a total of seven status groups listed in this particular poll.¹¹

On the other hand, Packard appears to separate most officers from what he calls the "Real Upper Class," and place them in the "Semi-Upper Class." His definition of members of the latter class states that they are, "mostly confident, energetic, ambitious people who went away to college, then began a career somewhere away from their home town or neighborhood. Most of them are with a fairly large organization where they are decision makers serving as managers, technologists, or persuaders." Admittedly, this is taking liberties with Packard's adjectives, however, I feel that most successful naval officers fit the description, or they would not be successful.

A survey was made in early 1960 by two former naval officers who had graduated from the Naval Academy in a pre-World War II class and a pre-Korean War class. In this survey these officers contacted

¹⁰Public Opinion Surveys, Inc., Attitudes of Adult Civilians Toward the Military Service as a Career.

¹¹Vance Packard, The Status Seekers, p. 111.

their respective classmates who had also resigned from the Navy and on whom they had valid addresses. The response to the questionnaires which were sent out was as follows: Class of 1941, 57 persons or 66%; Class of 1949, 99 persons or 35%. When asked the following question, "Why did you leave the Service?" the questionnaire listed several choices of answers and asked the participant to check each answer applicable in his case without regard to priority. The results were as follows:

	Class of 41	Class of 49
Seek more interesting or challenging work.	35%	47%
Seek greater monetary rewards,	26%	48%
Limited opportunity for promotion (CAPT. & above)	28%	26%
Disillusionment with Navy as a career.	16%	37%

When asked, "How do you now rate your life as a civilian compared with what it might have been if you were still in the Navy?" the answers were as follows:

	Worse		Same		Better	
	1941	1949	1941	1949	1941	1949
Compensation (monetary)	4%	7%	7%	18%	89%	74%
Job satisfaction	11%	6%	32%	24%	57%	70%
Social status	7%	5%	64%	54%	30%	41%
Associates	9%	12%	84%	61%	7%	27%

In spite of the answers given above, and only those questions which can be related to prestige were quoted, a very revealing pattern was evident when the question was asked, "Would you like your son to make a career of the Navy?" "Yes," answers for the Class of 1941

totalled 76% and for the Class of 1949 were only 49%.¹² It will be noted that the members of the class of 1941 are the fathers of those young men who are now entering the age group or are in the age group where important decisions are being made concerning military service. It is also suggested that these former officers were thinking strictly in terms of having their sons making Navy careers in the officer levels. The group in question is also highly biased in view of their previous association with the Navy. As mentioned before, I do not put much faith in public opinion polls and therefore have presented this evidence only for what it is worth. In speaking of prestige rating technique in community stratification, Robert A. Ellis states,

As the very paucity of the evidence presented here indicates, much more work needs to be done before any final conclusion can be drawn about the utility of the Prestige-rating technique. Furthermore, the contradictory results already obtained suggest quite clearly the necessity for including a wide, rather than a narrow, range of criterion variables in the tests that are conducted.¹³

It would be difficult to conduct a public opinion poll using the six factors of Packard which have been listed previously, since I feel that the public is relatively uninformed concerning the way in which

¹² Tully Shelly, Jr., and Richard W. Taylor, "The Civilian Point of View," Shipmate April 1960, pp.6-10.

¹³ Robert A. Ellis, "The Prestige-Rating Technique in Community Stratification Research," Human Organization Research, p. 336.

these factors would apply to naval officers. One pertinent example comes to mind. I have talked with many civilian friends who were firmly convinced that naval officers pay no income taxes. Such a belief is a relic of the war years.

Many of the authors who have written about the public opinion of the profession of being a naval officer concur that it has relatively low prestige. "In the United States the military profession does not carry great prestige . . . officer-ship remains a relatively low status profession."¹⁴ Another quotation, which is very close to being identical with the preceding one by Janowitz and with other statements made in The Professional Soldier, states,

It is clear that public opinion tends to cling to a traditional concept of the military officer. There is some realization of the authentic role now played by the military, but the gulf between reality and public concept is great; and, reality notwithstanding, the attractiveness of a career as an officer is governed by the concept which the public holds for such a career. It is generally recognized that, despite public acclaim of individual military heroes, officership is a low-status profession."¹⁵

On the other hand, as we have seen previously, C. Wright Mills includes the military officer in what he refers to as the "power elite."¹⁶

¹⁴ Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p.3.

¹⁵ William H. Bines, "A Call to Arms. . . For Peace," Harvard Business Review, Jan-Feb, 1960, p. 100.

¹⁶ C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, p. 276.

I believe that in the various opinions expressed above that both Janowitz and Bines have included all military officers as a class in their conclusions, whereas, Mills is referring to the top echelons of the military hierarchy.

There are many civilians who are convinced that the only reason a man makes a career being a naval officer is because that man does not have enough self confidence to make a living in the civilian world. There are others to whom I have referred previously who are still carrying grudges and, by now, highly exaggerated memories of World War II or Korean War experiences. Then there are those who will never be convinced that the Navy actually goes to sea. Some look down upon it as a generation of men who are supported out of the public funds and cared for from the cradle to the grave. These same people are the ones who rate Navy men as second class citizens because of the many fringe benefits which are provided out of their pockets. All of the foregoing groups of people could be classified into what could be called, if the expression will be excused, as the great army of uninformed or misinformed.

CHAPTER IV

THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC OPINION

The most immediate concern with the public opinion is, that if the public holds the military profession in low esteem, it will be more difficult to attract capable young men into the Navy and to retain those we have in the junior ranks. A far greater problem is the long range effects which a lack of trained personnel will have on the capability of the Navy to accomplish its assigned missions. In addition, unfavorable public opinion can create havoc with the legislative processes which are so necessary to the life of the Navy as well as the other services. The concern expressed above has been recognized for some time by our personnel experts and was brought to the attention of the Secretary of Defense in 1953 by the Womble Report.

There exists an unwholesome amount of irresponsible criticism of the implementation of our national military policies. The more vociferous of critics aim their slanderous attacks at our military leaders whom they refer to derogatorily, collectively and repeatedly as 'the brass.' More recently 'the brass' has been extended to connote all career military officers as a class. The committee cautions that the continued degradation of career military officers as a class can do irreparable damage to our ability to attract and retain capable personnel. Able and conscientious men will not indefinitely continue in a profession dishonored by public criticism.¹⁷

¹⁷ Ad Hoc Committee on the Future of Military Service as a Career that will Attract and Retain Capable Career Personnel, Department of Defense, Oct. 1953.

More recently than the Womble Report, it has been stated that,

The conditions of employment of a military officer are the product of a never-ending stream of public opinion. The effectiveness of military leaders is deeply conditioned by the interest and status which civilian society accords the profession. In effect, society gets what it pays for. . . . A public convinced that a military career is a low-prestige profession creates apathy and hostility fundamental to legislative inertia. Legislative inertia perpetuates the universally recognized inferior conditions of employment. The services are then unable to compete effectively for quality officer personnel and the concept perseveres, not always without reason. This is a self-fulfilling prophecy at work -- one that fulfills itself as a result of the behavior of the person who makes the prophecy and believes it.¹⁸

Public opinion finds its way to our elected representatives in Congress. It is offered that most of the letters written to Congressmen by constituents are an expression of public opinion which is adverse in nature wherever the military is concerned. This is human nature, for a person who is angered is more likely to spend the time writing a letter to his Congressman than a person who has something of a complimentary nature to say. Having spent two years preparing answers to Congressional inquiries which related to the alleged performance of naval officers, the writer found that letters which praised specific acts of performance were a rarity. In almost every case, these letters, which were written to Congressmen by their constituents, were concerned

¹⁸ Bines, op. cit., pp. 99-100.

with specific incidents and not a general expression of disapproval of naval officers as a group. It is only fair to state that it was also a rarity when the specific allegations were found to be based upon fact and not distorted. Whether the Congressman read these letters or the official naval reply is not known, however, the greater the quantity of adverse type letters received, the greater the likelihood that public opinion will sway the Congressman in his way of thinking whenever a Navy subject is discussed. Officers who have had duty in Washington, and many who have not, are well aware of the political fact of life that Congress, through control of the purse strings, controls the destiny of the Navy. It should be apparent that if public opinion is good and if naval officers are held in high esteem by the public, there will be less apathy on the part Congress toward the Navy. It should be recognized by every naval officer that there are some members of Congress, especially those on the Armed Services Committees, who have had long tenure and are highly informed about naval matters, and who will probably not be swayed by individual letters of complaint. There are others who are openly anti-Navy and find in such letters fuel for their fires. There must be another group who can be swayed by public opinion. It is the latter group which I hope takes the time to read the official replies which are made to their inquiries.

CHAPTER V

THE GRASS ROOTS OF PUBLIC OPINION

Every person who is mentally capable forms his own opinion on matters of which he has concern. The process of forming opinion is a result of things which can be seen or heard, things which can be perceived by the senses. Personal experiences probably play the biggest part in the formulation of opinion, however, any form of mass communication also plays an influential part. Newspapers, television, radio, magazines, books and movies all act to sway public opinion one way or another. We are all propagandized daily in some way by these media. It is debatable which is least desirable, an uninformed public or a mis-informed public.

In a survey conducted in 1955 on the Attitudes of 16 to 20 Year Old Males Toward the Military Service as a Career it was pointed out that 64% of the teenagers questioned indicated that they had formed their opinions of the Armed Services from talking to people who had been in the service. In a similar survey of adult males, 49% stated the same reason but, in addition, 23% stated that their opinions were formed from personal experience in the service.¹⁹ This indicates that in addition to personal experience, word of mouth is also important. Word of mouth is easily distorted or exaggerated.

¹⁹Public Opinion Surveys, Inc., Attitudes of 16 to 20 Year Old Males Toward the Military Service as a Career.

THE HISTORY OF THE
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FROM THE FIRST SETTLEMENT TO THE PRESENT TIME

BY SAMUEL JOHNSON, ESQ.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

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NEWSPAPERS

It has often been said that one should only believe half of what one reads in the newspapers. I do not subscribe full to this point of view, however, I am a firm believer that there is a certain amount of distortion to almost every story which is printed. Contrary to the announced policies of many of our newspapers that their primary aim is to report the news, their primary aim is really to sell newspapers. Therefore, many of the dailies resort to a deliberate distortion of the true facts or to the printing of incomplete stories. Unfortunately, there are also a few reporters who are at their literary best whenever they can attach their by-line to a story which is obviously anti-military. For example, we are still carrying the scars which a nationally syndicated columnist in Washington gave us back in 1946 and 1947 when he referred to all military officers as, "Brass Hats" and to naval officers as "Fancy Dans." More recently, an anti-military newsman in the San Francisco area championed the cause of a naval officer who was medically diagnosed as a paranoid and kept the story in print for the better part of a year. Some of the stories which appeared under his name were absolute distortions of true fact and some were true as far as they went. The latter were so worded that when left incomplete, the reader was led to the drawing of a false conclusion. William H. Bines, a writer who is

pro-military, states,

Since service personnel are both transients and members of low-status profession, it is my observation that their actions are ready targets for the local and national press. The press, in tireless pursuit of mediocrity, often seems anxious to publicize and distort the actions of the military -- on or off duty -- to please those who search their columns for inconsequential ballyhoo. To quote the board chairman of the world's largest press empire, 'If I produced the sort of paper I really wanted to read, no one else would want to.'²⁰

Although it hurts prestige for newspapers to publicize the actions of some military officers, there can be little argument against factual reporting. On the other hand, freedom of the press does not give the press license to distort the true facts of any situation. Un-rebutted distortions do not enhance prestige.

TELEVISION

The newest of the mass communication media, television, probably reaches more people than any of the others by virtue of the sight and sound advantages. There is probably less distortion of the news on television than in the press, since time usually allows the reporting of fact and restricts editorial comment. There have been several series which have helped to increase the prestige of the Navy as a whole. One which is still being re-run

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Bines, op. cit., p. 100.

as a testimonial to its popularity is Victory at Sea. This is without doubt the best received of the group. Others such as Navy Log, The Silent Service and Men of Annapolis have all helped to inform the public of the importance of seapower. Occasionally, there appears a Navy type story on the dramatic shows or the talent shows but no specific comment can be made as to the worth of these. In addition, there are several public service panel discussions, such as Meet the Press, which thrust our top naval leaders in the public view. I think the Navy has fared well in its bouts with the cameras and the provocative panelists who seem to revel in firing loaded questions.² Mills says of these members of the "power elite," that they are celebrated as a result of the positions which they hold and the decisions they are called upon to make. He states, "They are celebrities because they have prestige, and they have prestige because they are thought to have power or wealth. It is true that they too must enter the world of publicity, become material for the mass media, but they are sought as material almost irrespective of what they do on and too these media."²¹ Television plays its part in forming public opinion and, therefore, can do much in the way of influencing the prestige attached to the naval officer. The boys on Madison Avenue also do their part with their "grey

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C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, p. 83.

flannel tongues." I recall a recent coffee ad in which a naval officer's cap resting conspicuously on a table is supposed to impart a certain status symbol to the home in which this coffee is being used. I can also remember seeing recently an animated type advertisement which is used for recruiting young men into naval aviation. In this particular sequence a couple of bouncing cats, one a saxophone player and the other a drummer are conversing in the language of a beatnik about the virtues of a career as a naval aviator. Man, its really way out. Is Navy money paying for such trash? If prestige were measured on a scale, I'm certain that it would drop ten points each time this particular commercial is shown.

RADIO

Radio is similar to television but it does not have anywhere near the impact of television. News reports and commentaries probably play the biggest part in the forming of public opinion. In the aforementioned study concerning attitudes of teenagers toward the military, radio was not even mentioned as a factor which influenced attitudes.

MAGAZINES

Magazine articles play a definite part in impressing the public. When asked, "Have you seen anything in a magazine recently that gave

you a favorable impression of service men?" Affirmative answers were indicated by 18% of the teen-agers and 14% of the adult males. When asked, "Have you seen anything in a magazine recently that gave you an unfavorable impression of service men?" Affirmative answers were received from only 5% of the teenagers and 3% of the adult males.²² Of course, one has to be motivated to read certain articles which appear in magazines. This accounts, in part, for the relatively low percentages which are given for each side of the picture.

NOVELS

Books have their place too. Anyone who has read these books will remember the Ensign Pulver of Mister Roberts, the Captain Queeg of The Caine Mutiny and other stupid officers in novels such as Don't Go Near the Water, All the Ships at Sea and others. This type of undesirable publicity does little to increase esteem or respectability and it is entirely possible that there are many otherwise uninformed who look upon all ensigns as the Pulver variety and all commanding officers as Queegs. In many cases these books were written by disgruntled former servicemen and were based upon wartime experiences. At least one Navy captain cashed in upon

²²Public Opinion Surveys, Inc., loc. cit.

his access to information and his ability to write, in spite of the fact that he knew he was ridiculing a part of the officer corps. As was mentioned previously, it is admitted that the Navy was sorely lacking in leadership at times during both World War II and Korea. This helped to bring on a rash of post-war novels which portrayed the officer in a bad light. The Honorable Richard Jackson, former Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Personnel and Reserve Forces commented, "Similarly, we must ask if the spate of critical novels, plays, movies, and cartoons may not have been caused in part by real failures in leadership. The themes that run through Mr. Roberts, The Caine Mutiny, All the Ships at Sea, and so on, are those of anger and disgust, as well as of sardonic humor over poor leadership."²³ In reference to The Caine Mutiny and the moral issues involved therein, William H. Whyte, Jr. points out that it is plain that it is not for the individual to question the system. "An extraordinary point of view, but did Americans gag on it? In the critical reception of the book most people got the point - and most of them agreed. Partly this was a contemporary reaction to the spate of war books which in lazy anger personified the evil of war in officers and discipline."²⁴ The books

²³ Richard Jackson, "Improvement of Naval Leadership," Navy Management Review Feb, 1960, p. 4.

²⁴ William H. Whyte, Jr. The Organization Man, pp. 225-226.

are not limited to war novels by our authors who have written best sellers. One of the often quoted authors whom I have read during this past year is Arthur K. Davis, a pre-war sociologist who received a commission in the Navy and then wrote about his experiences when he returned to civilian life. Some of the quotations from one of his articles are most revealing. I object to them for two reasons. First is because Davis was a member of an "elite" Fleet Air Wing Staff during World War II. If this is the only duty which he had, then he has never really seen the Navy. Secondly, I object because an author such as Robert Dubin has included Davis' article, Bureaucratic Patterns in the Navy Officer Corps, which was written shortly after World War II, in his textbook, Human Relations in Administration. This was printed in 1959 and is supposed to give the Navy as an example of bureaucracy. Some of the characteristics of naval organization listed by Davis are, "Avoiding responsibility: the philosophy of do-the-least. . . The Buck Passing pattern. . . " "Legalism: The psychology of affirm-and-comform. . . The play it safe attitude toward the naval career. Regulation becomes a sacred cow." In addition, he states, "If Regulation is the sacred cow of the military system, ritual is its golden calf."²⁵ Some of Davis' observations may have been true during World War II; however, it is doubtful if such actions would be allowed to persist very long today

²⁵ Arthur K. Davis, "Bureaucratic Patterns in the Navy Officers Corps," Human Relations in Administration, pp 352-355.

without official action being taken. Apparently, no one has attempted to tell Mr. Dubin that the information is a little out of date, and students of sociology go on reading Davis' views.

MOVIES

Movies are the last of the mass media which I have mentioned. Since many movies have been adapted from the war novels mentioned and others which were not, the same comments with regard to them apply. Of course there are other movies which have scripts which were written solely for the production. Prestige is both raised and lowered by movies and it is difficult to analyze unless one has seen all applicable movies. At least when a movie is made with the cooperation of the Department of Defense and/or the Department of the Navy, an officer is assigned as technical advisor. It becomes the duty of the technical advisor to insure that the production will be in conformity with good taste. The naval officer can take a certain amount of chiding as long as it is not too vicious.

FACE TO FACE

Not to be overlooked in the formulation of the public's opinion of naval officers is the method which should be most obvious

but one to which little thought is given. This is the method of face to face communication. Several of the reference books have indicated that the military is an isolated group of individuals who come into little contact with the civilian world. In today's world, nothing could be further from the truth. In the Navy especially, government furnished quarters and housing projects have failed miserably to keep pace with the expanded forces which have come into existence since World War II. It is only natural that many of our social contacts are with others of our own service, but this is simply human nature and can be found with the members of almost any large industrial organization. However, the mere fact that we must seek housing for our families off the base, if there is such a base, means that we are living amongst civilians. The first time the writer has ever been assigned to public quarters is at his present duty station and this was after having been commissioned, and married, for over 15 years. There are some officers of the rank of commander who have never been assigned to public quarters and without a doubt, even a few captains. It is while we are living within the confines of the civilian world that we are able to influence public opinion, good or bad, of the way of life of the naval officer. There are many officers today who are doing more than their fair share in establishing good community relations through active participation in the many facets of public and com-

munity service, such as PTA, Boy Scouts, Little League, Toastmasters, Home owners groups, etc. And let us not forget the part our wives play in establishing neighborhood contacts and in their volunteer work in the community. All these, then, are the grass roots of public opinion and we do have excellent opportunities to sew a few good seeds.

CHAPTER VI

THE SELF-IMAGE

With public opinion as it is, what, then, is the self-image of the naval officer? Are we not looked down upon by a public who is convinced that we are unable to make a living in the civilian world? Will we not have more prestige when we accept retirement gracefully, whether we want it or not at the time, and step into a new career as a teacher in the public school? Are we not continuously vilified by some Members of Congress, especially during the appropriations hearings? As we advance in rank do we not find that the privileges which once were granted to the rank to which we now identify ourselves have been rescinded or possibly advanced just one more rank ahead? Unfortunately, it appears that the answers to all of these questions is, "Yes." As I have said previously, I feel that the prestige of the naval officer is in a period of ascendancy, but this does not prove that it is high. It is pertinent to this study to note at this particular time that I had thoroughly intended to enter with a basic premise that officer prestige was quite high at this time. After much research, I was compelled to change that hypothesis to one which says merely that prestige is in a period of ascendancy, and that positive and determined steps must be taken to prevent its future decline. I am not selling the professional career naval officer short. I find it

necessary to concur fully with Janowitz that, "every profession assigns to itself a higher status than outsiders would be willing to concede, and every leadership group has a self-image which fails to correspond to the image the public holds. Yet the

'crisis' in the military profession is as much a crisis in self-esteem and self-image as it is a crisis in organization and purpose." ²⁶ One of the most revealing articles I have ever read

which concerns the self-image of the naval officer was written by a Marine Corps lieutenant colonel just five years ago. ²⁷

Many of the examples he gave have stuck in my mind these few years and it is evident that his article did some good. But not enough of his recommendations have been carried out. The main theme of his writings was that the special trust and confidence which we once enjoyed, which we once were given with our acceptance of a commission, has diminished to a low point. In speaking of this lowering of officer trust and confidence, LTCOL Heinl states,

It is simply this: an alarming erosion of the status, privilege, and confidence heretofore reposed in the officer corps has taken place under our very eyes. This erosion has awakened widespread complaint, frustration, and even bitterness, among officers who have served any length of time. It has unquestionably discouraged likely young men of high caliber from becoming regular officers. By leveling out dis-

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Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 225.

²⁷

R.D. Heinl, Jr., LTCOL, USMC, "Special Trust and Confidence," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1956.

inctions between officers and enlisted men, it has imposed serious handicaps on leadership of the most effective quality."²⁸

In speaking of the self-image of the naval officer it is necessary to make a distinction between the several ranks. It is only natural that the self-image of the admiral will be much higher than the newly commissioned ensign, yet in recognizing this distinction, the ensign does it with a sense of humor. How many times have we all joined in a chorus of, "Oh, the officers ride in their motorboat, the admiral, he rides in his barge, it don't go a goddamn bit faster, but it makes the old -----feel large"? Prestige? You bet it is, and more power to him, if he is a seagoing type of admiral.

The mirror in which the naval officer views his image is constantly being steamed up by hot air from all quarters. He has long since been used to such overworked platitudes as, inter-service rivalry, Pentagon red tape, duplication of effort, bureaucratic thinking, military mind, waste and inefficiency, mis-use of manpower, wasteful spending, abuse of privileges, ceremonial splendor, military discipline, authoritarian or autocratic action, and the like. All of the foregoing make eye-catching headlines which the general public views through distortion correcting

²⁸
Ibid., p. 466.

glasses. To say that we don't have any of these would be untrue, however, none of them are so widespread that they should be damning to us as a group. They are the clichés, the tools of the trade of the mass communication media.

One of the virtues of the naval officer is a high sense of honor. When this honor becomes strained, for the several reasons which have already been stated and several more yet to be brought forth, is when prestige begins to slip and the self-image becomes blurred. As Janowitz puts it,

In a democratic society it is highly inappropriate for honor to be the sole, or even dominant, value of the professional military cadre. Honor comes to be combined with and dependent upon public prestige and popular recognition. The military must be afforded sufficient prestige and respect to insure a sense of self-esteem. But the rank and file professionals, and even many members of the elite, are not certain that this is evidenced in the attitudes of non-military society. Whether, in fact, the officer behaves as a heroic fighter or as a military manager, the anomalous position of the military professional in American social structure has literally deprived him of a consistent self-image. Even the most assault-minded officer does not consider himself a gunman; he wants to be esteemed for his patriotism, public service, and judgment. The 'cold war' has only served to further fracture military self-esteem. It is . . . true that military leaders have come to figure more prominently in public life. However, there has been no general rise in the prestige accorded the military officer; nor has there been any greater willingness among young people to take on the responsibilities of military service.²⁹

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Janowitz, op. cit., pp. 225-226.

Once again we find that Janowitz is in disagreement with Mills and his conception of the power elite, for Mills has given prestige to the military elite because of the power of the job in this unsettled world.

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In his article, "Special Trust and Confidence," Lieutenant Colonel Heinl, Jr. cites the reasons why he feels that the attitude toward and within the corps of officers has deteriorated:

- (1) Egalitarianism on the national scene. *equality*
- (2) Continuing large size of the Armed Forces.
- (3) Lower caliber and easygoing indoctrination of young officers.
- (4) Tendency of administrative thickheadedness to override individual discretion and common sense.
- (5) Side effects of the *Uniform* Universal Code of Military Justice.
- (6) General relaxation of officer discipline and officer self-discipline.³¹

Although LTCOL Heinl wrote these words in 1956, most of the reasons still apply today. If any of the reasons have been decreased, probably the fourth and six are the ones. I would say that the current leadership program has assisted to make these decreases.

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C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, p. 276.

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Heinl, op. cit., p. 406.

Another avenue of self-image, one which can become a rough road of conversation among officers, is the alleged difference between the Naval Academy graduate and the non-graduate. Recent selection boards for the higher ranks, CDR through RADM, seem to select a majority of academy graduates. A more accurate statement is that when separated by groups, the attrition among academy graduates percentage-wise is less than that for each other group such as USNTs, augmented former reserves, etc. I refuse to believe that this is a result of the fact that academy officers are on the boards. As a matter of fact, I know that selection boards are not comprised only of academy graduates. Selection boards which convene to select rear admirals obviously have the highest percentage of academy graduates on them simply because most of our admirals are graduates. Having served as a recorder on a selection board, and having several friends who also served in that capacity during my recent tour in BuPers, it was discovered that when the reviews of the officers' official records were made by the members of the board, no attempt was made to give specific groups of records to any specific member. This means that the academy graduate could have his record reviewed by any member of the board. The only distinction made was by designators.

There are many facets which enter into the selection process and it is a well known fact by now that each selection board has

its own specific criteria which they use in making the determination of who will be selected. To mention a few; age and physical condition, amount of education and whether or not a degree was awarded, duties and billets, various information in the selection board jacket,³² and lastly, but most important, the fitness report jacket. Janowitz makes the bland statement, "But when all other factors are in balance, the service academy graduate has the advantage."³³ He does not corroborate this statement. The point here is that it would be easy to say that the self-image of the non-academy graduate is lower than that of the graduate. In a survey made by a student at the Navy Management School at Monterey, California in March and April, 1961, in which 1000 questionnaires were sent out to officers with about three years' service or less, to the midshipmen of the Naval Academy and the NROTC units of two universities, and to officers candidates, one of the questions was: "In my opinion, the general civilian populace holds a naval officer in:" The results are tabulated below.

	Officers who say they are career oriented	Undecided career-wise	Civilian oriented
Extremely High Prestige	37	48	31
Above Average "	108	171	135
Average "	24	27	52
Below average "	1	3	9

³²See Bu Pers Manual, Article B-2201 (1) (b) for further information regarding contents of the selection board jacket.

³³Janowitz, op. cit., p. 137.

In tabulating his results, the author stated that he was surprised to find that more naval academy graduates checked the middle two categories, above average and average, whereas reserve officers and former reserve officers tended to mark the first two categories.³⁴

With all the evidence appearing to stack up for the self-image of mediocre prestige, I think it important to state that there are some who look upon the status of the naval officer as quite high. These are the officers who feel a deep sense of personal honor and integrity as an officer and a gentleman, with or without the often quoted, "by act of Congress." These are officers who feel that another of our virtues is the ability to lead, in spite of the events which brought forth General Order 21. These are the officers who believe in seapower as an absolute necessity if we are to protect the security of our nation and that we are, in a way, standard bearers. These officers can rationalize that their lack of personal fortunes, which are a usual measure of prestige, is made up for by personal sacrifices and that they should be respected by the public for their part in national security. This quest for respect, they like to believe, makes it so.

Each naval officer has his own self-image which is a generalized thing. He also finds that the general feeling is subject to

³⁴LCDR F.W. Woodworth, SC, USN, "The Career Decision," Management School Research Paper, 18 May 1961.

daily events which act to increase or decrease the size of the image. A newspaper article, Congressional action, a contact with the civilian world, an occurrence in his command, a bureau instruction, a movie, novel or TV program can each act to sway opinion at that particular moment.

CHAPTER VII

THE FORCES WHICH ACT AGAINST PRESTIGE

To this point we have looked at prestige in a clinical way in an attempt to build empirical evidence of its current status. Let us now turn to some specifics and provoke thought about the forces which act to deflate or destroy both the public viewpoint and the self-image. These are the factors, the recurring type and the every day variety, which inhibit the Armed Forces in their quest for better officers. These are the factors which must be altered or suppressed if our Armed Forces are to remain strong and to develop through the years, so that they will be able to perform whatever missions might be assigned to them in the future. Somewhere I have read that, "the CNO [or whatever he may come to be called] of twenty years from now is somewhere a lieutenant in today's Navy."³⁵ Where is the young man who will be our top naval leader thirty years from today?

THE CONGRESS

What better place to start with specifics than with the power of the people. "Section 8. The Congress shall have Power To. . . provide for the common Defence [Sic] and general Welfare of the United States . . . To provide and maintain a Navy . . . To make

³⁵

Unknown Source

Rules for the Government and Regulation of land and naval Forces."³⁶ These quotations emphasize the civilian control over the military through Congressional control of the purse strings. Most naval officers will agree, almost without reservation, that the basic and historical concept of civilian control is necessary to the continuing greatness of the nation. The frustration which is caused by the pressure groups within the Congress, groups which delight in taking pot shots at a service which is rival to their cause or groups which are ever striving to reduce the privileges and benefits of the military, does little to produce service prestige or unity. Janowitz claims that, "A few conspicuous civilian leaders [such as Carl Vinson and Richard B. Russell] are seen as heroes, but the military shares the civilian image that politicians are an unworthy lot. . . There is little appreciation of the fact that a political democracy requires competing pressures."³⁷ On this same subject, Bines has noted,

Congress has been vocal about service disunity and there has been, in fact, considerable difference of opinion among the services. Congress, however, is less vocal about its contribution to the disunity. The fundamental causes of the disunity are the budgetary process and the fact that the missions assigned to the individual military departments have become competitive rather than complementary.³⁸

³⁶ The Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 8.

³⁷ Janowitz, op. cit., p. 251.

³⁸ William H. Bines, "A Call to Arms . . . For Peace," Harvard Business Review, Jan-Feb, 1960, p. 101.

It is usually during the budgetary process before the appropriations committees that the representatives of the various pressure groups in Congress go to work on the military leaders. "Not only must the professional officer endure the criticism, but he must watch personal [Sic] legislation interfere with officer quality and thus assure the existence of more material for criticism."³⁹ The same criticism seems to go on whenever legislation is introduced in Congress which pertains to benefits for the Armed Forces, whether it be pay, housing, retirement, etc.

Another method of breeding frustration and contempt is practiced by the very few. This is the sensationalism approach which some Congressmen use to enhance their own position in Congress by the exposé of certain practices, policies, and personnel. These are the torch-bearers, the crusaders and the champions of the underdog.

In the absence of policy differences of consequences between the major parties, the professional party politician must invent themes about which to talk . . . since World War II, among frustrated politicians there has come into wider use the accusation and impugnment of character -- of opponents as well as of innocent neutrals . . . Hunting headlines in this context, with less patronage and without big engaging issues, some Congressmen find the way to temporary success, or at least to public attention, in the universalization of distrust.⁴⁰

Representatives of the mass media keep a close listening ear to the public utterances of Congressmen and whenever sensation-

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, p. 257.

al charges are made, and printed, some people listen and are impressed. I need mention only a few subjects to clarify this point: Air Force Manuals, Enlisted Servants, Naval Weapons Plant, and of course we could go back to a few of the clichés which were mentioned previously.⁴¹

It would be possible to go on and on to show how Congress has lowered the prestige of the naval officer through investigations, hearings and legislation. Some will be mentioned under other specific headings later. One which should be mentioned before proceeding further concerns such platitudes as waste and inefficiency. The Congress, as a body, is forever trying to get the military to close installations which are claimed to have outlived their usefulness and, as a result, are a drain on the public's pocketbook. But what happens whenever a military department or the Department of Defense attempts to do just that? Immediately Congressmen who have a local interest are up in arms because it will mean a loss of jobs for their constituents. Even the most vociferous advocates of economy and efficiency back down a little and say, "Close them down--but not in my neck of the woods." It would be interesting to read a few of the Congressional inquiries which have been made of the Executive Departments as a result of Secretary McNamara's recent cutback of installations.

⁴¹ See page # 34

THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the President has indisputable power over the services. This does not mean that he can be without fault. However, when an executive order emanates from the White House, what more can the Naval officer do but counter with a cheery, "Aye aye, Sir"? One of these orders did much during the last days in office of President Eisenhower to decrease the prestige of all military men. The headline, "Ike Orders Return of Dependents," which appeared in many papers, shocked the military from top to bottom. I think the most important facet of this order was the apparent reduction of the military man to the status of second class citizen, since nothing was mentioned about other U.S. citizens abroad. Former Secretary of Defense Gates said, as quoted in the Navy Times, "our people are accustomed to sacrifice and traditionally military men have been separated from their families for long periods."⁴² Had the following statement been made at the same time, prestige would have probably snowballed, downhill," . . . new Navy Secretary John B. Connally frankly admitted his nagging concern: 'I was surprised to find that the average [emphasis supplied] Navy man on sea duty gets to see his family about 90 days out of the year.'⁴³

⁴² Navy Times, 30 Nov. 1960, p. 14.

⁴³ See "National Affairs," Newsweek, 27 Feb 1961, p. 27.

When the order in question was finally rescinded, the Navy gained some prestige by the very fact that the plight of the serviceman overseas had been publicized and the Navy had done little criticizing of the order.

The new administration is off to a fairly good start, but not without a critic or two along the way. The Army-Navy-Air Force Journal took a few pot shots at the White House and asked Secretary McNamara to stop, "what appears to be the start of an open season," on the prestige of military officers. One of the items cited the disapproval of a \$200,000 addition to an officers' club near Paris. The Journal said, "There is no question that President Kennedy has complete authority to stop such a project, but there is much room to question the manner in which White House Press Secretary Pierre Salinger made the decision known. . . . If Mr. Salinger's objective was to capture headlines, he succeeded." It went on to suggest, in effect, that if the usual Department of Defense channels had been utilized, "such a procedure would have accomplished every objective except one: It would have made no headlines."⁴⁴ In reference to the same article, "The magazine also criticized the manner in which Maj. Gen. Raymond E. Bell, chairman of the U.S. -Brazilian Military Commission, and Adm. Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval operations,

⁴⁴ See Army-Navy-Air Force Journal 11 Mar 1961.

[Sic] were criticized in public instead of in private."⁴⁵

These are but a few examples, and I can not help but wonder if they are part of a plan on the part of the new administration to drive the services together by reverse psychology. This would be a better trick than creating a separate Department of the Air Force in hopes of achieving the complete unification of the Armed Forces.

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Where Congress has indirect civilian control of the military, the Department of Defense, as an executive department, has direct control. The personality of the Secretary of Defense plays an important part in the prestige pattern of the services. A weak or ineffective SecDef, as well as one who is high-handed and too powerful, opens himself, and the services which he administers, to public criticism. That it is difficult to attract and retain top-flight civilian executives in this job was recognized by the Hoover Commission. This commission also noted, "For various reasons, tenure in the Secretariat is too short to provide the leadership and civilian control which our system of government requires. The tenure of presidential appointees in the Department of Defense and the predecessor departments, during the past ten years has averaged less than

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"Barbs at White House Reflect 'Open Season on Military Officer Prestige'," Monterey Peninsula Herald, 13 Mar 1961, p. 25.

eighteen months."⁴⁶ Without the proper continuity in office of our top-level civilian officials, especially those who leave office before a change of administration, how can prestige but suffer? In connection with this office, one of the factors which lowers its prestige, and consequently the prestige of the services is the requirement that the appointee divest himself of all interests which might influence his actions while in office. This lack of trust on the part of Congress is not in the best interests of the nation. If such a person were to betray the public trust placed in him, there are many ways in which he could be made to pay. As it stands now, the Senate confirms such an appointment after saying, "We will trust you only after you have given up your other interests." While on this particular subject, this requirement may have acted in favor of Secretary McNamara since he found it necessary to decree that servicemen could no longer buy foreign automobiles tax-free, ship them home at government expense and import them duty free. What a clamor might have been made if he had not divested himself of Ford holdings.

There are many policies and orders which emanate from the office of SecDef. It has been said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been by-passed in recent weeks. It is not possible at this time to determine the truth of this claim, but if such a practice is going on in the Pentagon, service prestige is in for a big blow.

⁴⁶ Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Subcommittee Report on Special Personnel Problems in the Department of Defense, Jun 1955, p. 10.

Some of the specific policies which will be brought out in the next section undoubtedly originate in the office of SecDef, however, since it is up to the Department of the Navy to implement them they will come under its heading.

THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

In addition to policies and regulations which come from the executive branch of the Government, some of the following items will be recognizable as Congressional legislation. As pointed out much earlier, the factors which influence prestige are closely related and blend into the spectrum. Let us now look at some of these factors item by item. It will be noted in some of the factors which will be discussed that we are, in fact, our own worse enemy.

PAY

It has been said that naval officers will never become wealthy unless they marry money, inherit money, have an outside income or write a book. Each naval officer knew that service pay was not the best when he made his career decision. However, not many of them felt that service pay would be allowed to fall behind the salaries paid to comparable civilian pursuits, especially in the higher ranks. If inflation did not keep cutting into the purchasing power of the dollar and if pressure groups were less successful in influencing Congress concerning the so-called "fringe

benefits," I doubt that there would be much clamor about pay raises. After all, longevity pay raises are made every two years in most cases.

Senator Stennis had some interesting remarks to make when he introduced the Military Pay Act of 1958 on the floor of the Senate.

I believe that the bill, if enacted, would go a long way toward meeting the problems of retaining men in the service, to round out a military career. However, I think we should emphasize the fact that a real military career is also based, at least partly, on a sense of service, a sense of mission, a sense of pride in being in the service and wearing the uniform of the particular branch to which a person belongs.

William H. Bines also had some interesting things to say about the same pay bill. "Legislative vision, apparently obscured by the mist, determined that there was no retention problem among generals and admirals, but no career officer missed the point--the potential leader is provided with little monetary incentive." ⁴⁷ It is true that money can not buy prestige, but it certainly helps. Fortunately the credit rating of naval officers is very high and we can buy the symbols of status on time, as does a large percentage of the remainder of our population. But this is not a plea for an increase in base pay at this time. It is a plea that if one is proposed in the future, it will re-

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William H. Bines, "A Call to Arms. . . For Peace," Harvard Business Review, Jan-Feb 1960, p. 102.

cognize the responsibility of higher rank and pay for it. Also, since a pay raise usually acts to bring servicemen up to date at the particular time that it is enacted, only to start falling behind again, it is hoped that if one comes it will be geared to the cost of living in some way to prevent time lag.

ALLOWANCES

Of the several allowances which are given to navy men, the only one which I will comment upon is the quarters allowance. When the Military Pay Bill of 1958 was passed by Congress, no increase in the quarters allowance was made. In fact, no increase has been made in the quarters allowance since May, 1952. No one needs to be told how rentals and utilities have increased since that time. Even if the tax free advantage of the quarters allowance is taken into consideration, wherein the actual cash value would increase approximately twenty percent, it is rare to find a naval officer who is able to obtain suitable quarters and stay within the allowance received. There is no definition of suitable civilian quarters. If there were one, it would be necessary to consider the number of dependents. The quarters allowance for officers makes no distinction for the number of dependents of the officer concerned. As mentioned previously, the self-image of any profession is higher than outsiders would concede. Is it not true, therefore, that most of us attempt to find living accommodations which are just a little richer than our

pocketbooks can afford? If we were determined to stay within the allowance received, especially in cities where there is a high concentration of military, we would have to live in comparatively low rent districts. Naturally, the more dependents, the more bedrooms are required and the price goes up. The quarters allowance does not make any distinction as to where the officer is assigned duty. If unfortunate enough to be sent to a high cost of living ^{over} in the continental United States, the naval officer, in effect, takes a substantial cut in pay.

PUBLIC QUARTERS

An allied subject of the quarters allowance is public quarters. In a recent article, the Army-Navy-Air Force Journal stated,

It will probably never be possible or desirable to provide Government housing for all military personnel. Therefore, it is imperative that adequate allowances be authorized for the larger percentage of our people who cannot be provided public quarters. The world wide deficit in available housing and the current inadequate allowances forces our personnel to reduce their standard of living or exist so marginally as to live in an atmosphere of constant financial tension. Failure to provide either the housing or reasonable and adequate allowances will negate other efforts to improve the retention of required skills.⁴⁸

While there is no announced policy for establishing the adequacy of civilian housing, there are guidelines concerning

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"Pentagon Plans New Action to Boost Pay, Allowances," Army-Navy-Air Force Journal, 1 Apr 1961, p. 27.

the size of units which are built as Capehart Housing or public quarters. The allowable square feet can be translated into a number of bedrooms and from this into the rank or ranks for which it is applicable. It would be assumed from this that the higher the rank, the larger the quarters. However, when public quarters are assigned at installations where there are quarters available for officers who are not a part of the command structure of the base, consideration is often given to the number of dependents involved. Officers with larger families are given larger quarters, in spite of the fact that their ranks may be lower. This is incompatible with both the amount of the quarters allowance and the fact that the quarters allowance does not take into consideration the number of dependents. In situations of this kind, the privilege of the more senior officer is being disregarded. This situation seems to occur only to commanders and below. It is a policy based upon virility, not seniority.

The administration of public quarters is a headache and a mess, as almost any officer who is concerned therewith can attest. As the result of a lack of empathy and other factors, which are caused by a centralization of policies in the Bureau of Yards and Docks, many residents of public quarters are made to feel that they are second class citizens. Here at the Naval Postgraduate School, there is a decided difference in the manner in which a commander

living on the school grounds and one living in La Mesa Village [formerly Capehart Housing] are treated, yet each gives up exactly the same quarters allowance. Units in La Mesa are inferior to the homes located on the grounds. Commander students in La Mesa are responsible for cutting and weeding their own lawns, while on the grounds the commanders have their lawns carefully manicured by Public Works. If not cared for at La Mesa to the satisfaction of the civilian housing manager, the commander receives a written memo signed by the civilian housing manager. Garbage collection is a rather minor point, but goes a long way to point out the differences. La Mesa residents are authorized to fill only two garbage cans a week for a weekly pickup, whereas the residents on the school grounds are authorized to fill three garbage cans and have a bi-weekly pickup. If we are to be concerned with prestige, we might start right at the bottom with the garbage can.

Lieutenant Colonel Heinl brought up the question of grass cutting.⁴⁹ This paper is not a request that all naval officers, regardless of rank, have their grass cut at the taxpayers' expense. However, isn't this time consuming triviality a prestige factor? The answer to this will probably be conditioned by whether I am referring to an admiral or a captain -- or even a

⁴⁹ R.D. Heinl, Jr., LTCOL, USMC, "Special Trust and Confidence," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, May, 1956, p.467.

commander.

It might be a worthwhile move to place the operation of public quarters at each installation under a system similar to the Industrial Fund concept. This would remove the construction, maintenance and repair of public quarters from the budgetary process and preclude use of the time worn phrase, "We just don't have the funds to do that." It is possible that if they were put on a paying basis the profits could be reverted to improvements of buildings and services.

There have been many instances where the adequacy of public quarters, as far as the type and condition, has served to act against officer prestige. An example of this occurred in the early 1950s on Guam. Officers were allowed to tear down, move and rebuild quonset huts for use as housing for their families. The quonsets were free but the labor was the responsibility of each officer. After the project had been completed, the Navy turned around and collected their quarters allowances. There have been many cases where dilapidated quonset huts have been considered adequate quarters. It is doubtful that anyone making such a determination was living in one of them at the time. ✓

Lastly, the question of quantity. Rarely does one ever find enough housing units to go around at any naval installation. For some reason, the Army and Air Force fare much better in this regard. ✓ This is particularly a sore subject at overseas duty stations where,

as a result, it is at times not possible to travel concurrently with dependents. In some cases, the waiting period before dependents are allowed to travel is six months to a year. This is an anti-morale factor and, consequently, also anti-prestige.

COMMISSARIES

Our commissary stores have been under the constant fire of Congress ever since World War II through the incessant din of the chain store pressure groups. The Hoover Commission attacked them as competing with private business, especially in large metropolitan areas such as Washington, D.C. It must be true that commissaries do undersell the large grocery chains. If they did not, would one find the long queues waiting to get into the commissaries or to check out through the registers? It has been said that, on the average, if \$100 were spent in a commissary, it would take \$123 to purchase the same list of groceries at one of the competitive chain stores. Of course this would not be completely true if service wives shopped for the loss leaders or took advantage of the week-end sales. Not all service wives shop at the commissaries. Most wives that do, either live on the base or close to the commissaries or are owners of a deepfreeze.

Commissaries at remote installations or at overseas bases usually do not come under fire of Congress since they are considered to be in compliance with the intent of Congress in the authorizations of commissaries. However, in a way, commissaries can be

likened to the quarters allowance situation. This is especially true in some high cost of living areas in which there are no commissaries. In these areas, the personnel assigned suffer a cut in pay.

As mentioned in the Hoover Commission report, the grocery chain business is highly competitive. If commissaries were closed at non-remote locations, these chains, which actually are in finer competition as a result of commissaries, would feel free to raise prices. If this happened, the civilian populace would feel the effect as much as the military.

It should be realized by now that the writer considers any action which results in an effective reduction in pay to be contrary to the raising of prestige. ✓

NAVY EXCHANGES

Those who have been in the naval service since before the start of World War II have seen the Navy Exchange deteriorate from an operation through which one could buy anything from a toothbrush to a new automobile at a reduced price, to a highly restricted variety store. Many officers also remember that when they made a choice of the Navy as a career that this was one of the many advantages (now called fringe benefits) which was pointed out. However, as another result of pressure groups, which have even gone so far as to infiltrate navy exchanges without proper

identification to prove a distorted viewpoint, the exchanges have been vilified and relegated to selling items which cost less than a certain dollar value. An ironical twist has taken place as a direct result of the foregoing pressure groups. We find that in many locations where there is a high concentration of the military, discount houses are now flourishing. Such civilian owned and operated stores as GEM in the Washington, D.C. area, AGE in the Vallojo and Alameda area, and many others in various parts of the country, cater not only to the military, but also to any employees of the federal, state, county and municipal governments.⁵⁰ These same pressure groups are now smarting under their loss of business to these discount houses and are putting more and more pressure on the Congress for the enactment of Fair Trade legislation. In these areas, it makes a very small financial difference whether the military population shop at exchanges or discount houses, since most of the prices for items which can be purchased in the exchanges are comparable in the discount houses.

As with the commissaries and public quarters, there are many Navy personnel stationed at places where these fringe benefits do not exist.

Each member of the naval service is indoctrinated that the

⁵⁰ GEM Stands for Government Employees Mart, AGE stands for Affiliated Government Employees.

items which are purchased in the navy exchange are solely for his own personal use, the use of his immediate family or for use as a bona fide gift. However, when a purchase is made which amounts to more than \$5.00 it is required that the service member or his dependent sign an affidavit indicating who will use the article. The penalty for misuse is loss of exchange privileges. Such a procedure for a member of the service, especially for a naval officer, indicates a lack of trust and acts to lower prestige. If a naval officer abuses this privilege, then by all means take administrative action against him. On the other hand, the officer should be trusted and not suspected at the time of the purchase. ✓

The Hoover Commission recommended that "Consideration should be given to operating Post [Navy] Exchanges by private contractors on a concession basis."⁵¹ The Navy Exchange has been recognized as a fringe benefit for many years because it sells merchandise at a reduced price. It is also recognized as a convenience, especially for those who are living aboard the station on which it is located. The writer feels that if the operation of Navy Exchanges were turned over to civilian interests on a concession basis the first advantage would be completely wiped out. They could

⁵¹ Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Subcommittee Report on Business Enterprises in the Department of Defense, Jun, 1955, p. 47. Recommendation number 32.

be operated differently, with better efficiency and better service than they now experience. The apparent monopoly which they now enjoy tends to make them somewhat apathetic toward their customers. I would like to see a corporation of retired officers and men take over the operation of the navy exchanges and commissaries, for there is much talent to be had from our retired ranks with past experience in these fields. In addition, such an operation would certainly assist in supplementing the retired pay of those persons involved. As a concessionaire, this corporation would be entirely removed from regulation by Congress. A fringe benefit would be restored and prestige could be enhanced.

MEDICARE AND MEDICAL CARE

A few platitudes seem to be in order at this point. The primary mission of the medical department is to provide care to active duty personnel. If you are going to be sick, find out the hours of sick call. There is an acute shortage of doctors in the naval service. Have a seat over there and wait-- and wait-- and wait. These are but a few of the medical truisms we hear throughout our careers. There are many more. Similar to the stories which were said to be told by returning veterans about officers in an earlier chapter, almost every serviceman and his wife can tell one equally as good about the

treatment experienced at the hands of a member of the medical department.

At least once a year each officer goes through the production line, a procedure which is often referred to as an annual physical examination. Since it is necessary to make an appointment for the examination, it must be known that you are coming. As a matter of fact, one usually is told to report no later than 0800 hours. To go into the many details of the waiting lines which are experienced would be wasteful. The point is this: The attitude which prevails is that these medical people are doing the officer a huge favor. An officer's time is much more important to the Navy than a corpsman's, at such a time, and in many cases more important than that of a junior medical officer. There are times other than during annual physical examinations when the sitting and waiting routine occurs.

But what about dependent medical care? I have always impressed upon the civilian members of my family that they do not wear my rank. Therefore, when they find it necessary to seek medical treatment or advice, it is expected that they will be treated equally with the other civilian dependents. This is not always done as anyone can attest. At times, the treatment is too equal. A good example of this is when all pre-natal appointments are made for the exact same time, and the ladies

find it necessary to jockey for position to get to see the doctor. Of course, some clinics have solved this problem by providing a first in, first out arrangement. I am not suggesting that the treatment of my dependents lowers my prestige by virtue of my rank. What I am suggesting is that the treatment accorded to all dependents lowers the prestige of all ranks. ✓

When the Medicare program was effected, I hoped that the prestige factor would be but one of the many problems it would solve. It has not, and we have all seen how it has become a political football which is kicked around by the Congress, the American Medical Association, and the Armed Forces.

In an article in the Navy Times, John J. Ford stated, "The Navy estimates it costs \$102 for a full year for the medical care cost for a man and his dependents. This is what the total medical care bill averages out to: the navy doesn't necessarily spend that much on each man."⁵² It can only be assumed that this means the total amount is based upon the cost of medical care for the serviceman and his dependents at service facilities as well as the costs of the Medicare Program. If this assumption is correct, it is suggested that

⁵² John J. Ford, "Defense Hike of \$2 Billion Looks Likely," Navy Times 29 Mar 1961, pp. 1 & 20.

a special study be made of the entire medical program in the Armed Forces to determine the feasibility of placing all dependents under a health insurance program similar to Blue Cross and Blue Shield. It is not the intent of this suggestion to reduce, in any way, the medical benefits which are now available to the dependents of military personnel nor to increase the costs, in any way, to the serviceman. If the price tag is \$102 per man today, think of what it would save the services in pay and allowances by reducing the number of doctors, in the cost of facilities which would not be needed, in the cost of drugs which would not have to be furnished. There would probably be enough saving that dental care could be provided under the same arrangement. As a side result, it is felt that the prestige of every man in the service would be raised for there would be a less benevolent attitude on the part of everyone concerned.

OFFICER PERFORMANCE

A recent two year tour in the Officer Performance Division of the Bureau of Naval Personnel taught the writer many lessons about officer performance, or, as we used to call it, officer mal-performance. One of these lessons is that there are a very few officers who do immeasurable harm to the reputation of the many. Our best statistics indicated that there was less than

one-half of one percent of the officers who could be placed in the mal-performance category. This must be considered as an excellent control since the quality control of mass production standards, are lower than this. Included in this low percentage were officers who were the victims of various kinds of accidents and who suffered the pains of administrative punishment, in spite of the dedicated lives which they had led. This group is not being referred to, nor is the obvious mis-fit who is released early if discovered.

The group with which I am concerned is composed of the officers who have evidenced intent in their actions which have brought discredit upon the naval service. This group contains the dishonest, the alcoholic, the homosexual, the bad debt or bad check artist, the martinet, the rum-runner, the court order violator and others. Unfortunately, this group is the last to care about their fellow officers and the consequences of public ridicule which effect each one of us. It would not be proper in a paper of this kind to go into any details as some of the cases might be too easily recognized. Suffice it to say that too many individual cases were, in effect, kicked upstairs by both commanding officers and their superiors when action could and should have been taken at the command level. Of course, directives from higher authority dictated Washington level action in some

of the instances mentioned. It is the fervent hope of General Order 21 that improved leadership will improve officer performance and reduce the one-half of one percent figure even more.

There is a group of officers who are at the precarious position of being at the bottom of the "hump" who have experienced both feast and famine. At the very end of World War II, these officers were catapulted into positions of higher responsibility because many reserve officers senior to them were getting out of the navy upon the accumulation of the required number of points. However, at the same time, the number of ships and squadrons remained constant. For lack of numbers of officers to fill the billets, these officers had to do the job. But then came the reduction in the number of ships and squadrons. In this situation, and with the "hump" problem, the Navy found that it had too many officers in the higher ranks such as LCDR and too few in the junior ranks. LCDRs were given the jobs which would normally be assigned to LTs, and some LTs found themselves also lowered in their responsibilities. One case in point was a LT who had been personnel officer immediately following World War II in a patrol squadron, as an ensign. Three years after Korea, as a lieutenant, he was again assigned as personnel officer of a patrol squadron. Under similar circumstances, it is little wonder that our junior officers find that the assign-

ments which they are given are lacking in responsibility. These attitudes can be seen in the figures given previously on page 13.

RETIRED PERSONNEL

There have been some fairly sensational headlines throughout the country in the past few years as a result of the actions of retired officers. Some of these retired officers have used the title of Rear Admiral. A rabid segregationist is still making the headlines, illegal liquor dealings have caught others, non-support and indebtedness still others. Since these old sea dogs are fairly invulnerable to the UCMJ, although still subject to its provisions, it is suggested that their retired organization make an effort to put their house in order. Whether an officer is retired or not makes little difference to the press, as the word admiral is spelled the same either way.

CHAPTER VIII

NAVY ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE PRESTIGE

As mentioned previously, the attempt to increase the prestige of any group must come necessarily from within the group. In an address before the Naval Postgraduate School RADM Martel stated that the new Secretary of the Navy is interested in establishing or raising the dignity of the naval officer.⁵³ It is hoped that his interest will be placed into a formal program soon.

The first step to increase officer prestige after the Korean War came in 1954. This was the re-introduction of the sword. I remember the day the order came out very well as I spent one hour standing in line at the post office at Atsugi, Japan waiting to buy a money order to send home to my dependents. Before my application could be accepted by the enlisted postal clerk, regulations stated that I had to obtain the signature of another naval officer who knew me personally. The reason for this was to prevent my sending home black market money. Has the sword actually increased the prestige of any officer who had to purchase one? I have seen swords used for three things: Military inspections of regular officers; forming arches at military weddings; and cutting cakes.

A recent attempt to increase prestige has been the recognition

⁵³ RADM Martel in an address before the students of the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 1 Feb 1961.

of those officers in command at sea. The idea of setting these officers apart from the others is commendable. The device, the oversize gold star, is a poor choice and looks similar to a "prop" from a TV western. This particular facet of prestige is tied to the star as a symbol, but the same star is to be found on the sleeve of the unrestricted line officer who is eligible for command at sea. However, it is also on the sleeve of the restricted line officer, the lawyer, the PIO, the Wave and others.

I feel that Special Trust and Confidence⁵⁴ did much to cancel out some of the activities being carried on within commands which detracted from prestige and I urge the reader to read or re-read that article in order to prevent being our own worse enemy. Actions by individual commands, therefore, assisted to raise prestige. Hundreds of examples of prestige lowering regulations, actions, etc. could be elicited if anyone really cared. I ask the reader to think of just three, and what he has done or can do to correct the situations. Two final quotations are in order.

Since World War II, in fact, the warlords have caused a large-scale and intensive public-relations program to be carried out. They have spent millions of dollars and they have employed thousands of skilled publicists, in and out of uniform, in order to sell their ideas and themselves to the public and to the congress. [Sic] The content of this great effort reveals its fundamental purpose; to define the

⁵⁴Heinl, op. cit.

reality of international relations in a military way, to portray the armed forces in a manner attractive to civilians . . . The aim is to build the prestige of the military establishment and to create respect for its personnel . . . "55

Improving the recognition and prestige of the public service is not a mere public relations task. It calls instead for more sustained and objective attention to the virtues as well as the deficiencies of the public service by the President, Congress, the leaders of the interest groups and of the communication media, and the leaders of the educational system.⁵⁶

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C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, pp. 219-220.

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Wallace S Sayre, "The Public Service," Goals for Americans, p. 294.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS

The spectrum of prestige is broad and includes many factors. Every naval officer intent on making the naval service a life's work expects to receive recognition for his efforts. He desires to be respected and trusted. He seeks both self-confidence and the confidence in his abilities as expressed by others. He wants to live an honorable life, and hopes that through his service and advances in rank he will be given a position of status and esteem; that he will be placed in high social class regardless of his origin.

As a consequence of this way of thinking, the career officer abhors the attempt of any person or any group to deny him such prestige. However, the prestige of naval officers is subject to a fluctuating cycle which, unfortunately, is geared to the state of national security; high in war, low following war and an uphill battle from there.

Prestige is only one factor which influences career choice. If younger officers and their younger civilian brothers see naval officers held in high esteem by both the public and their older officer brothers, the influence will be positive rather than negative. I was reluctant to change my opinion concerning the present status of prestige, for I felt it had been rising since a year or

two after the Korean War. After much thought, I realized that my rank had also risen. My self-image of rising prestige was not wholly a result of being a naval officer, it was tempered by advances in rank. Therefore, I found it necessary to be content with the evidence which seemed to prevail that officer-ship was a relatively low status profession, but, nevertheless ascending.

If prestige is ascending and if there are forces which tend to lower it, then it follows logically that positive steps should be taken to assist the ascent and to resist the fall. What can be done?

RECOMMENDATIONS

Prior to making any recommendations, I wish to emphasize one main point. This is not intended to be a "gripe" paper; it is a study of officer prestige. It is natural that it includes some of the factors which detract from your prestige and mine. It has not included all of the factors, for no one can list them all. Nor has it included all of the examples which came to mind or which were recommended by others. Some of the recommendations which were made or implied in the body of the paper will not be included in my formal recommendations, for further repetition would serve no useful purpose. For example, who can tell Congress or the Press to change their ways?

If it is agreed that steps should be taken to improve officer prestige, the following recommendations are offered to the individual and to the applicable groups for guidance:

1. Each naval officer should become conscious of his self-image and vow to:
 - a. Conduct himself in a manner, morally and professionally, which will not reflect discredit on his officer status nor on the naval service. ✓
 - b. Be conscious of his responsibilities to the community in which he lives, whether it be civilian or military.
 - c. Demand the privileges of his rank and authority, without abusing the privileges or evading his responsibilities. . ✓
 - d. Require performance of his subordinates and increase the responsibilities of those who prove themselves capable whenever possible. ✓
 - e. Realize that all naval officers are in the Navy and to treat equals as equals, regardless of their relationship to his own organization.
2. It is recommended that each commanding officer:
 - a. Re-appraise his method of reviewing and approving the reports of fitness of his subordinates to give the reviewing authorities an absolute and fair picture of the officer concerned, regardless of his background.
 - b. Conduct a survey of his command to uncover and correct practices which are detrimental to officer prestige.
 - c. Be aware that the mis-use of men, money and material is wasteful and will bring forth criticism, both official and public.

3. The many bureaus and offices of the Navy Department should re-affirm their understanding that officer prestige is important to the procurement and retention of naval officers and take action to enhance prestige whenever possible. Some methods of accomplishing this are:
 - a. Formulate a policy for the administration of Public Quarters which will be more realistic with regard to the adequacy thereof. There is no logical reason why officers of different rank must pay different amounts for identical quarters.
 - b. Uniform changes.
 - 1) Hang up the sword as an archaic memento of the past. Require it no more. ✓
 - 2) Re-design the command at sea pin as an integral part of the aviators' wings or submariners' dolphins for those authorized to wear it. In the case of other unrestricted line officers, the pin could be worn above the ribbons. In other words, keep the star but reduce the size.
 - 3) Design other sleeve devices for those officers who are not unrestricted line officers eligible for command at sea. ✓
4. The Department of Defense can do much to improve prestige. In the body of this paper, some of the following items were treated under the Department of the Navy for reasons explained previously. However, the following recommendations are made to the Department of Defense where proposals are either approved before submission to higher authority, or sidetracked.
 - a. Establish a policy that apparent distortions of the press will be investigated in full and vigorously re-buffed when possible. This should include sensationalism, which can be easily recognized by those in authority.
 - b. If pay legislation is proposed in the future, make a determined effort to prevent the usual larger increase for the lower pay grades. Insist that incentive to advance be paramount to drawing longevity.

- c. Make a determined effort to gear any future pay raise to the cost of living, after the initial raise adequately catches up to the present day.
- d. Propose legislation to increase the quarters allowance as soon as possible and gear it to rank, not number of dependents. Make provision for an adequate increase for those who are assigned to high cost of living area, where government quarters are not available.
- e. Conduct a feasibility study to determine the advantages and disadvantages of placing Public Quarters under the Industrial Fund concept.
- f. Improve the overseas quarters situation sufficiently to allow for the concurrent travel of the serviceman and his dependents, if such servicemen is eligible for government quarters.
- g. Conduct a feasibility study to determine whether or not it would be advantageous to turn all non-remote located commissaries and navy (and post) exchanges over to a concessionaire such as a corporation of retired service men, both officers and enlisted.
- h. Conduct a complete investigation into dependent medical care and dental care to determine if a health insurance program would assist in cutting down the number of doctors needed and, at the same time, improve the care given to our dependents -- at no cost other than now required of the serviceman. ✓

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